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Abstract 
To facilitate scientifically grounded innovative forms of strategic network coordination, this paper 
integrates two major bodies of literature on competitive advantage. The two bodies of literature are 
the industry-oriented outside-in approach, and the competence-oriented inside-out approach, here 
homogenized along the dimensions of degrees of firm embeddedness, respectively, the broadness of 
shared resource bases. The elements detailed are interfirm relationships, resource bases, network 
governance instruments, coordination mechanisms, the impact of events on network structures, and 
the active mobilisation of actors and resource. Thereby, the paper is able to detail 5 generic types of 
business networks. Next, it relates 21 network governance instruments to type of partnerships 
(binding vs loosening), forms of interaction (cooperative vs opportunistic). The realized reduction of 
network complexity enhances conceptual transparency and increases the instrumental usage of this 
research for effective network coordination by businesses. An integrated case illustrates the 
usefulness of the various concepts and the coherency of the different elements. 
KEYWORDS: Agribusiness chains and network coordination, network theory, innovative 
institutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In difficult times organizing effective business networks becomes one of the key tasks of companies 
in order to (re-)gain competitive advantage, which requires clarification of the different elements in 
networks coordination. Networks have a long and diverse history in business, society, and in 
research, but it is only of recent date that the focus of business, consultancy and research shifts 
towards its value creation and value delivery (Ritter et al., 2004). That is, we see a rise of interest in 
business networks, towards managing collaborative arrangements to gain or sustain competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis outside competitors. In the emerging business world of chains and networks one 
observes a wide spectrum of collaborative networks, for example R&D- networks amongst 
pharmaceuticals, standard setting networks in consumer electronics, flexible industrial districts, 
guanxi networks, airliners’ global hub-and-spoke networks, physical electricity grids, optimized 
retailer supply chains, and virtual mobile phone networks. Firms experience increasing difficulty to 
maintain their competitive positions by relying exclusively on current activities realised by owned 
resources and capabilities. ‘A business enterprise looks more like a linking unit where its strategic 
attributes lie in how it connects other market participants to each other.’ (Hakansson & Snohota, 
1995). The positive relation between networks and competitive advantage seems to be 
uncontroversial. Controversial are the sources and determinants of the competitive advantage of 
networks and their consequences for understanding different types of types, and the normative 
structuring on networks, i.e. design, management, and governance. By detailing 5 business network 
it is our aim to enhance conceptual transparency and increases the instrumental usage of network 
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research in structuring business networks. The application to the Dutch horticultural network serves 
as illustration. 
Regarding the sources and determinants of competitive advantage there are two broad 
perspectives.: the inside-out and the outside-in perspective, each largely ignoring the insights 
developed by the other. The industry-centric outside-in perspective focuses on the influence of the 
interfirm relationships to explain the behaviour of individual firms and networks of firms. The 
competence-centric inside-out perspective focuses on the resources and competences of firms and 
networks. They appear as competing explanations of competitive advantage. The inside-out 
perspective focuses on how broadly competences of individual firms are intertwined for the 
collective aim of the network. The outside-in perspective suggests that the organization of networks 
occurs either through firm-individual responses to external competitive pressure or through 
collective, embedded firms. By this paper we detail the insights of viewing these as complementary 
explanations of business networks. 
In this paper, taking an strategic approach, we argue that integrating these two perspectives is 
necessary to gain more overall insight of the complexity of organizing networks to achieve 
competitive advantage. Indeed both perspectives, although paying attention to different aspects, 
focus on the same issue. For instance, the inside-out concentrates on the fit between the firm 
strategy and their business environment, whereas the outside-in perspective takes other factors in 
consideration like the business relationships and ties. We will use illustrative typologies, for a 
taxonomy brings a systematic grouping of items, using a small number of criteria, making it easy to 
distinguish and discuss cases. It facilitates the justified reduction of network complexity, which is 
one of the most important tasks in chain and network management (Hanf & Dautzenberg, 2006, 81). 
Combining the two bodies of knowledge will result in a theoretical framework in which two 
dimensions of networks’ organization will be related as two axes to present different types of 
networks. The resulting quadrants define four types of network organization which locus will be 
reflected in the quadrant names.  
To assess the usefulness of the selected concepts every step will be illustrated by an 
application of the presented concept. The illustration is from the Dutch horticultural sector, more in 
particular its potted plant sector. The Flowers and Food cluster is known for long to be the strongest 
cluster of the Netherlands (Snijders et al., 2007), featuring cut flowers, potted plants, bulbs and 
vegetables as its most competitive sectors thereof (Jacobs et al., 1990; Porter & Van der Linde, 
1995; Porter 1998), looking at the relative share in international exports (Jacobs & Lankhuizen, 
2006); and the Balassa index (Hinlopen & Van Marrewijk, 1999). The potted plant sector suits our 
objective, because its firms combine efforts in business networks such as cooperatives, boards, 
councils and trade associations (Porter, 1998). Nevertheless, although the value of Dutch potted 
plants exports amounts to EUR 1.1 bln per year, that is 70 percent of the exports by European 
countries, the projected figures on consumption patterns and export growth indicates that the Dutch 
may loose export market share. Therefore, the sector has, united forces in the platform Flor-I-Log to 
formulate and implement strategies to strengthen its position in Europe. The illustrative sections will 
focus on the following question: What new organizational forms can be implemented in the Dutch 
PP-sector to foster its ambition? 
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BUSINESS NETWORKS: WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 
Network research is diverse, for founding disciplines such as sociology, communications, 
psychology, economics, biology and medicine, logistics and organizational behavior, bring about a 
proliferation of terms, concepts, mechanisms, and studies, resulting in a multitude of partially 
contradictory results (Miles & Snow, 1986, 62; Contractor et al., 2006)). For example, it takes 
Todeva (2006) 16 pages to explain no less than 89 concepts. Moreover, when we look for articles 
with network(s) in the title, within the international database SCCI, we already track 5773 articles in 
the social sciences in the period 1995-09/2007, 327 articles of which are printed in the top-13 
scientific business journals. At this moment, network research orients itself to different levels of 
analysis, that is the personal network, firm internal or intrafirm networks, dyadic or relationship 
level, supply chain, business network, industry network, the country level, and even the global level 
of analysis (Ritter et al., 179; Hagedoorn, 2006; Contactor et al., 2006). The literature on networks is 
dominated by descriptive empirical studies, which comes at a loss of providing few widely 
applicable lessons (Croom et al., 2000; Harland et al., 2001). Although, there is no prevalent theory 
of networks (Sacchetti & Sugden, 2003), business-oriented network literature tries to understand 
behavior of firms via different forms of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) and their complex 
interdependencies (Hagedoorn, 2006), to arrive at normative conclusions. 
Interfirm relations can create value in combining firm resources, knowledge, and assets which 
will be difficult to be imitated by competitors. The value created originates from network 
characteristics, like relationships and the flow of resources between independent firms (Jones et al, 
1997). Despite sectoral and disciplinary differences, business networks have a number of defining 
features; a network requires organizations and/or individuals, with a degree of autonomy, 
systematically interconnected, and who have common goals, or interests ( Pitsis, 2007). Business or 
strategic networks may be further characterized by the fact that the network is an intended 
arrangement between actors, lacking an organizational authority to arbitrate (Moller & Svahn, 
2003). Based on a literature review, Todeva defines Business networks as ‘sets of repetitive 
transactions based on structural and relational formations with dynamic boundaries comprising 
interconnected elements (actors, resources and activities). Networks accommodate the contradictory 
and complementary aims …and facilitate joint activities and repetitive exchanges’ (Todeva 2006, 
p.15). In their overview on business networks. Ghisi & Martinelli (2006) offer some 17 definitions 
of business networks. In this paper we use the term networks for business networks, broadly 
speaking. We define a network as autonomous firms, who co-operate systematically on their 
complementary/shared objectives, with joint activities and repetitive exchanges to add value for 
clients. 
EXPLAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AT NETWORK LEVEL 
The most general idea of network literature is that inter-firm relationships can create relational 
rents which go beyond the efficiency arguments of transaction cost analysis. Although the 
understanding of networks has a long history in research, it is only of recent date that the focus shifts 
towards their role in value creation and delivery, i.e. in managing business networks (Ritter et al., 
2004, p.175). Interfirm relations can create value in combining resources, knowledge, assets which 
will be difficult to be imitated by competitors. This added value originates from network 
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characteristics like inter-firm relationships and the flow of resources between independent units 
(Jones et al., 1997). 
Roughly speaking, there are two major bodies of theory and research on competitive 
advantage (Wit & Meyer, 2004). These two major bodies are represented by the outside-in and 
inside-out perspective. From the outside-in perspective competitive advantage is viewed as a firm’s 
ability to adapt to industry forces. Some well known concepts are Porter’s five forces-framework 
(Porter, 1980), and the strategic group analysis (McGee & Thomas, 1986). This industry centric 
view, in other words, explains competitive advantage of a firm or network which is triggered by 
activities of competitors and other industrial parties. 
The inside-out perspective views competitive advantage from the angle of competence of a 
firm or network (e.g.. Grant, 1991) The level of development of valuable resources and 
competencies and capabilities assembled within a network determines whether or not a network can 
compete with another network. This competence-centric approach argues that resources, skills and 
capabilities supports and stimulates competitive advantage. Network creation and orchestration suits 
this view of taking the lead on the basis of superior competences.  
What happens when we treat these two perspectives as parallel explanations for competitive 
advantage? Both perspectives focus on how competing economic activity, in this case coordinated 
within a network, should be managed. The inside-out perspective within a network setting can be 
described as the diversity of resources that can be accessed (see Toms & Filatotchev, 2004): 
extensive – narrow resource base. The outside-in perspective highlights the fact that embedded firms 
within a network may take others more as competitors or more as partners, together responsive to 
developments in their environment: discrete – embedded (Meyer, 2007). Our objective is to present 
an integrative framework to explain the relation between business strategy and organizing networks. 
COORDINATING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: WHAT 
IS OUR NETWORK POSITION? 
Our structuration of networks is based on two dimensions. These dimensions give managerial 
answers to the question how to manage economic activities; (1) by managing the access to resources 
of involved parties and (2) by managing interfirm relationships. Additionally, we will detail a set of 
network alternatives where the geographical aspect is explicitly dealt with. .  
Interfirm relationships: Discrete – Embedded 
The concept embeddednes focuses directly at interconnectedness of parties in a network and in line 
with that interconnectedness of relationships. The IMP-group strongly advocates this approach to 
business (Anderson, Hakansson, Johanson, 1994, Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). Collaboration is 
directed at strengthening the position of partners; adding value. Every relation balances between 
competition and partnership. It is argued that companies embed themselves intentionally in a web of 
durable collaborative relations whether or not those relations are loosely or more tightly coupled. 
Embeddedness holds economies of time, integrative agreements, allocative efficiency, and complex 
adaptation. However, embeddedness can derail economic performance when the network becomes 
more and more dominant (resource base is narrow); the firms receives information and absorbs info 
on structural changes and shocks too late (Uzzi, 1997). The discrete organization perspective points 
at the idea, inspired by neo-classical economists, that organizations are fundamentally driven by 
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self-interest. Competition is, from this perspective, the natural state of affairs. Bargaining for price 
between buyers and sellers, grasping opportunities to get the upper hand over rivals etcetera 
motivate companies to strengthen the competitive position over others. Collaboration is aimed at 
inhibiting competition (De Wit  et al., 1998, 509-511). An overview of these approaches is given in 
Table 1. 
 
When we relate interfirm relationships to networks, one may divide networks along two dimensions, 
i.e. between dynamic vs routinized supply networks, the degree of network influence of the focal 
firm as the second differentiator (see figure 1)(Harland & Knight, 2001). This figure, grounded on 
extensive and diverse data gathering, places the key activities in the corners of the 4 boxes. For 
example, dynamic networks tend to compete primarily on innovation with rapid technological 
change. Partner selection and decision-making are key in  
TABLE 1 
2 Views on interfirm relationships Source De Wit & Meyer, 1998, 2004, p.512 
 Discrete Organization 
Perspective 
Embedded Organization 
Perspective 
Emphasis on  Competition over cooperation Cooperation over competition 
Preferred position Independence Interdependence 
Environmental structure Discrete organizations 
(atomistic) 
Embedded organizations 
(networked) 
Firm boundaries Distinct and defended Fuzzy and open 
Inter-firm relations Arm’s length and transactional  Close and structural 
Interaction outcomes Mainly zero-sum (win/lose) Mainly positive-sum (win-win) 
Interaction based on Bargaining power and 
calculation 
Trust and reciprocity 
Network level strategy No Yes 
Use of collaboration Temporary coalitions (tactical 
alliances) 
Durable partnerships (strategic 
alliances) 
Collaborative 
arrangement 
Limited, well-defined, contract-
based 
Broad, open, relationship-
based) 
 
networks with a dominant focal firm. The high level of influence of this orchestrator was caused by 
two factors: 1) His direct added value to the network or innovative capability was large. 2) His 
provision of access to the rest of the network (bridging) was considered critical by other firms. It 
may be in either dynamic or routinized networks that a focal firm is able to dominate, manage the 
network. This firm may hold a mainly positive sum perspective open to reciprocity and network 
strategies. However, firms state in interviews that when focal firms do not strongly influence the 
network, they typically find themselves having to cope with network operations (Harland et al., 
2001) , taking mainly a zero-sum approach, where power and transactional relationships dominate. 
There, motivation and allocation of costs and benefits are critical issues at network level. There is 
positive and negative evidence on success  
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FIGURE 1  2001. 
 
 
rates of dominated alliances vs balanced alliances (Nooteboom, 1999, 83). Key networking activities 
in routinized supply networks are equipment integration and info processing to optimize costs and 
stocks.  
 
In the Potted plant sector process innovations and stock minimization dominates product innovation, 
although varieties of flowers are abundant; This suits a routinized network (figure 1, right side). 
Next, the ambition of Flor-i-Log is to orchestrate an expanding network by spreading out current 
sourcing and trading activities over Europe. However, the outsider observes something different; so 
far progress in Flor-i-Log signals an urgent and ongoing need to activate and motivate firms in the 
network. That does not characterize network orchestration, but, to the contrary, a group of firms that 
perceive they have to cope with a network, are subject to it (figure 1, top-right area). Indeed, 
discussions are sensitive on the allocation of costs and benefits; what is shared and what is 
individually realized? 
 
Access to resources: extensive – narrow resource base 
Business network literature focuses on the strategic resource content. Managerial and 
entrepreneurial resources drive growth and diversification. Such resources might include specialized 
production facilities, trade secrets, and engineering experience. They also include firm specific, 
idiosyncratic knowledge assets. These firm specific factors are traditionally considered as the major 
drivers of strategic change according to the resource based view. The clustering of firms in networks 
may be promoted by through sharing trade secrets and drawing on local pools of experience and 
skilled labour. Organizational diversity and network characteristics are likely to be closely 
influenced by how firms accesses resources. Large and diverse organizations have, by definition, 
control over a wider resource base and have the option to internalize them using a hierarchical 
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structure. Similarly a small company, which has a shortage of resources, has to access resources via 
the market (Toms & Filatotchev, 2004).  
The resource base is emphasized in the following typology, distinguishing between lower and 
higher product complexity on the one hand, with supply networks of innovative/unique products 
versus functional products as a second differentiator (see figure 2) (Lamming et al., 2000). An 
extreme product of both high complexity and uniqueness is the Twinscan by ASML, a high-tech 
lithographic machine for the production of ICs, costing 20 million per system. In this field of the 
matrix, speed and quality supremacy are critical. The same is true for unique or innovative products 
that are less complex. Here, the information exchange is lower for it may be to the advantage of 
competitors. In networks with complex but functional products, like most cars, we see that 
sustainable quality and costs are critical in competition. In the last category we have standardized 
produce like soft drinks or DVD-recorders, where economies of scale are critical. As products are 
re-invented or become mature over time they may change form one box to another box. The network 
must orient itself to the related competitive priority and sharing of resources. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Supply network typology. Source: Lamming et al. (2000). 
 
 
At product level, and in comparison to other industries, Flor-i-Log may be characterized as a supply 
network of functional products with a at most moderate degree of product complexity. The product 
complexity in the Potted Plants sector relates to product quality sustainability, and the realisation of 
distribution channel-specific assortments. This suits a competitive priority on cost by high volume 
production and services. 
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TYPOLOGY OF NETWORKS 
Combining the two bodies of knowledge will result in a theoretical framework in which two 
dimensions of networks’ organization will be related as two axes to present different types of 
networks. The resulting quadrants define four types of network organization which locus will be 
reflected in the quadrant names. The proposed dimensions, in combination with various networks 
typologies add up to the following five network types. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Network typology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type 1: Primus network. The availability of extensive resources with firms within a network 
provides the possibility to hierarchally access these resources (Albers, 2007). On the basis of rough 
agreements between seniors on all involved firms, one firm is given substantial autonomy in 
planning on behalf of all partners involved. The emphasized common vision and aims create trust, 
shared interests, and joint investments, and self-enforcing safeguards. The shared aim is growth. As 
a result this requires only a few performance indicators, plus simple incentives and synergy 
allocation rules. With a high degree of direct supervision, informal communication, and only minor 
delegation by the seniors, this configuration suits best networking by a small number of ambitious 
SMEs. 
 
An example relates to Air Berlin, who was given substantial freedom by Air Lauda to plan 
both the fight networks for both of them. No detailed contract was drafted. Later Air Berlin took a 
25% share in Lauda and they invested jointly. The loss in autonomy was compensated by the 
expectation of a boost in turnover (Albers, 2005). 
Extensive
Narrow 
Discrete Embedded 
Resource base
Interfirm relationship 
3. Quasi integration/  
Technocratic/virtual 
4.Committee 5.Consensus/Senate 
1.Primus 
2.Dominated/supply 
I II 
IV III 
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Type 2: Dominated/ supply network. A second possibility for this combination of the 
extensive resource base and discrete position of firms, pending the partners selected in this network, 
is the type of dominated or supply networks. Partners from successive stages of a supply chain may 
aim at improving chain effectiveness, by concentrating on complementing the core competences-
driven activities of partners along the value chain. Although supply chain links may need to be 
intensive, communication innovations and cheap transport makes vertical integration of 
geographically dispersed firms redundant. It has the advantage of enabling (re-)contracting firms 
that are segments specialists, enabling the orchestrator to realize its ambitions quickly with 
relatively low (relation-specific) capital needs. Typically, the network splits up between cost 
oriented jobbers, value added providers, 1st tier partners, and a core firm, or orchestrator. A means to 
put the interest of the core firm central is to use of the head-and-tail format of developing and 
marketing the end product, optimally outsourcing or partnering for everything else, appropriating 
most of the value added as it has a central position bridging structural holes. Critical item in the 
vertical supply chain is the dependency-balance between network partners, all trying to gain and 
exploit unique competitive advantages. The resulting performance contrast between the supply 
chains of GM and Toyota is informative, as the first one stands for an zero-sum approach where 
short-term appropriation is focused upon, while the latter emphasizes more the positive-sum of a 
growth orientation. An alternative for a dominated supply chain is industrial district or cluster, 
where more or less equal, socially controlled partners leverage their specialist resource base and 
capabilities. 
There are many examples of this configuration, like Microsoft, Ikea, Toyota, and Nike (de Wit 
& Meyer, 2004, 552). Networks may vary regarding (de-)centralization of decision-making 
authority, be it horizontally between actors/firms and/or vertically delegation to certain layers in the 
organization. When the network focus is on a single stage of the supply chain we may refer to chain 
stores or franchisers, like many (smaller) retailers (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, in: De Wit & Meyer, 
p.557). 
Type 3: Virtual company, quasi-integration or technocratic network. This type of network 
which is characterized by extensive availability of resources and embeddedness has a broad scope. 
Under the leadership of a core group of early, often large experienced firms, mutual adjustment 
dominates the alliance governors board. Operationally, the size and position of the joint unit drives 
standardization and formalization with an elaborate monitoring system and complex synergy 
assessment and distribution rules. The firms will integrate or harmonize their systems to exploit the 
potential benefits, of this network that aims at efficiency (De Man, 2004) and growth (Albers, 2007) 
Alliance specialists and dedicated staff execute vertically decentralized, operational tasks. Strong 
competition, constraining regulation, or the need for internationalization may result from this 
configuration. in a rather stable industry. Firms are bound to stay in the group as a result of the 
network specific investments. 
Clear examples are the airline alliance networks, like Star Alliance, and shipping alliance 
networks, like the Grand Alliance, or networked cooperative banks. In the airline alliances, 
dedicated alliance managers run the elaborate joint business unit that coordinates the dispersed 
activities of the partners. The efficiency increase relates route planning, code sharing, and capacity 
management. A detailed monitoring system and extensive standardized and formalized practices 
result in furthering the integration of the firms in the network. The original partners still dominate 
the developing network. 
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Type 4: Committee network. The scope of this network is broad in principle, with growth aims 
and general intentions at the level of senior managers from the participating firms. At the network 
level this broad scope is effectuated because of innovative initiatives of workers at a decentralized 
level. The initiatives are organized via focused groups. In this manner a rather low degree of 
resources with individual firms is combined into new initiatives. A committee of alliance managers 
take the supportive nourishing and monitoring of the various projects. The committee does not detail 
any precise decision-making system nor revenue allocation rules. The embeddedness of firms 
stimulates a common culture, evidently mutual adjustment, low mutual uncertainty, and autonomy 
are standard practice. The result may be a myriad of collaborations, dependent on interest amongst 
firms and their employees to collaborate.  
An example in case may be an Australian network of 24 computer service firms. They have 
very flexible relationships with the initiating partner as project leader. The absence of a governing 
system makes that the emphasis of the networks is on the set of subgroups (Miles & Snow, 1995). 
Type 5: Consensus or Senate network. Partners, as in parliaments, delegate operational 
activities to a contracted, specialized company. The prime aim of partners is efficiency enhancement 
in a relatively stable and simple environment. As a restricted activity becomes a delegated matter for 
the partners, who are de facto competitors, no specialists are appointed, and the heads of the 
involved functional area, evaluate progress regularly. The heads are member of the alliance board, 
which has to deal only with a narrow scope. The firms know that the potential cost reductions are by 
definition restricted, which makes then inclined to distrust, decide by time-consuming consensus, 
fine-tune contracts, reject shared systems, and may employ third parties to enforce agreements. The 
size of the network will remain limited as mutual adjustment becomes an hindrance in larger 
networks. 
An example is the joint transport purchasing alliance by a group of consumer product 
producers, like Beiersdorf, Colgate Palmolive and SaraLee, to bundle their part truck shipments to 
retailers. Logistic operations are delegated to a Logistic Service Provider (Albers, 2007). 
 
The information sharing within Flor-i-Log turns out to be more limited than may be expected 
in networks with structurally embedded firms. Regarding such interfirm relationships the outsider in 
the PP-sector observes discrete firms who perceive each other firms primarily as competitors in 
appropriating a share of the value added. The project tends to realize limited collaboration on the 
resource bases, primarily on logistics. We conclude that Flor-I-Log suits the consensus-type of 
network (figure 3, lower-left area). In a consensus-requiring network the focus is on efficiency 
enhancement, i.e. cost reductions in a relatively simple setting. Such a collaboration will have a 
narrow scope, e.g. joint transport purchasing. We derive, that future collaboration is best based on a 
limited scope with focused value-for-money activities for individual (local) firms. 
NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
Dependent on the need for more radical change vs sharing (tacit) knowledge and system 
coherence, firms in networks may rely more on weak ties, respectively, on strong ties, and related 
forms of governance (Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1983). Firms have strong ties when they have 
enduring, intensive interactions. Firms have weak ties when they differ strongly, have no overlap in 
activities, and lack shared experiences. When innovation has to be executed by different partners 
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who remain in tune than strong ties are most useful. Alternatively, when creativity, non-redundancy 
between partners, and novel combinations are key, even at the cost of mutual understanding, than 
weak ties will be more rewarding. The preferred forms of governance are related to the preferred 
ties, for strong ties come with integration, with full acquisition as the strongest form, while weak ties 
come with disintegrated forms of governance, such as non-equity alliances (Nooteboom, 1999, 52-
3). Some reasons for preferring stronger ties and further integration, binding, are: 
• Continuity to recoup specific investments 
• Cognitive proximity to stimulate streamlined communication 
• To realise incremental, but systemwide innovations 
• To prevent opportunism, and knowledge spill-overs to competitors 
Arguments for preferring weak ties and looser forms of integration, are as follows: 
• Incentives for enhancing quality, efficiency and innovation, for survival 
• Flexibility in coupling modules in different market-suitable configurations 
• Diversity of experience and information yielding exploration new opportunities. 
Governance of inter-organizational relationships is directed by relational competencies, which 
are typically not subject to property rights, i.e. tradable legal ownership. In very general terms, 
companies may be said to be made up of assets (e..g buildings) positional advantages, and 
competencies (Nooteboom, 1999, 8-9). Assets are the resources of the firm. The positional 
advantages refer to efficient access to resources of other organizations, i.e. access to distribution 
channels, political acceptance, brand loyalty, and reputation. Positional advantages may result from 
deployed relational personal competencies, directed by organizational competencies, i.e. institutions. 
Next, institutions comprise of practices, procedures, rules, standards, norms of conduct, goals, roles 
models and rituals. Relational competencies determine the selection of the mode of governance, firm 
internally and between firms. The appropriate mix of instruments depends on the relevant goals and 
conditions. There are four generic classes of governance (Nooteboom, 1999, 8-9, 82):  
• Control: legal, bureaucratic, directive 
• Value: motivation on the basis of self-interest, partner-value  
• Binding: exit barriers, ‘hostages’, reputation 
• Loyalty: trust-based motivation, clan, values/norms, family, friendship. 
The instruments of governance related to these four classes have been listed. Value may be 
steered by the following instruments: 
1. Invest in partner’s resources, to improve the relationship 
2. Lower the partner’s value by devaluating his resources or shifting (contracted) volumes to 
other partners 
3. Invest in own relative value for partner, to make him more dependent, enhancing his loyalty 
4. Lower one’s own value by non-investing 
5. Appropriate the resources of (or similar to) a partner lowering the value of the relationship 
6. Actively collaborate to gain knowledge spill-overs  
Binding may be influenced by changing switching costs between partners: 
7. Stop relation-specific investments, lowering own switching costs 
8. Change the switching costs of partners vs your own, by demanding more guarantees for 
continuation of the relationship, claim refunds for your own specific investments, or sell part 
of your share in specific investments 
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9. The reverse case of offering more guarantees, or accepting higher share in specific 
investments. 
10. Increase switching costs of partner by demanding a socalled hostage, i.e. things that are 
valuable only to the ‘giver’, here the partner 
11. Increase your own switching costs by offering a hostage, i.e. things that are valuable only to 
you 
12. Lower switching costs by investing in more flexible technologies or by developing common 
standards for contracts, techniques, products, etc. 
13. Enhance switching costs by investing in reputation of trustworthiness 
Opportunism may be influenced via changing the room for or intent towards opportunism:  
14. Restrict freedom by tighter legal or other formal control, or increase monitoring, with related 
sanctions 
15. The reverse case is by accepting constraints on one’s own freedom 
16. One increases one’s freedom by reducing constraints or shielding off monitoring 
17. One signals heightened risks of opportunism by showing antipathy, lack of interest, or 
lowering norms 
Loyalty may be influenced by more non-business instruments 
18. Bonding: invest in relationship, by joint social activities, friendships 
19. Emphasize institutional ties, by becoming family-member of partner, accept consequences of 
social order and clans, stress norms of conduct 
20. Invest in reputation of trustworthiness which enhances loyalty of partners 
21. Shift from formal to social control  
Next to choosing for binding (stronger ties) or more loosening (weaker ties) of partnerships 
and networks, some instruments indicate a more cooperative vs a more negative, hostile, or 
opportunistic way or interaction. Thereby one ends up in 4 categories, on preferred instrument of 
governance vie-a-vie partners (see table 2). The numbers relate to the above stated list of 
instruments. 
TABLE 2 
 
Governance strategies and instruments Source: Based on Nooteboom 1999, pp.129-131. 
 
 
 
Binding Loosening 
Hostile, opportunistic Tie down 
6, 8, 10, 14  
Pass on 
2, 5, 16, 17 
Cooperative  Attract 
1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20 
Set free 
4, 7, 12, 21 
Table 2 clarifies for instruments with what approach it suits and how it impacts degrees of 
freedom, ties. We detail some instruments for the boxes, the numbers correspond with the listings 
above. In the box stated ‘Tie down’ one binds partners aggressively by increased monitoring, asking 
for hostages, or more guarantees and reducing his room for conduct. By ‘Attract’ one binds others 
by increasing mutual value, reinforcing bonds, and limiting one’s room for opportunism. In the box 
of ‘Pass on’ the firm increases its own freedom at the cost of others, develop alternative relations, 
 13 
 
VII International PENSA Conference 
November, 26-28th, 2009 -  Sao Paulo, Brazil
claims extra guarantees, and compensations, etc. In the box ‘Set free’ one facilitates switching for 
all, and open up options for all. Although the box attraction has become more detailed in research, it 
does not signal which behaviour is more often recognized nor recommended.  
Networks may both facilitate access to information, resources and opportunities, and it may 
help to overcome dilemmas of interfirm cooperation and task coordination (Garliulo & Benassi, 
2000). We now turn to the issue not of network coordination but of task coordination. As with all 
network issues also on the coordination mechanisms there are may alternatives firms can choose 
from, so we have to simplify by listing them along specific dimensions. Network governance has to 
balancing arguments and forces for integration with arguments and forces for differentiation. 
Although a networks consist of autonomous partners who willingly cooperate, there is always the 
possibility of a misfit in planning and control. As a consequence, contracts will always be 
incomplete (planning) and cheating, opportunism or abuse of position is often possible (control). As 
a consequence, ongoing coordination systems in a network will rely on a mixture of coordination 
mechanisms (Miles & Snow, 1995). Figure 4 lists some of them. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Coordination mechanisms in networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next to planning and control issues in network governance, firms must be aware that poorly 
imposed laws and rules may hinder the progress of a network. First, poor enforcement makes legal 
governance expensive or even infeasible. Furthermore, when the governance is rather legalistic, 
enforcement costs may become excessive. Finally, entry barriers will be high in the contrary case of 
a relational or personal attitude, with a predominance of family, clan, or religious moral order 
(Nooteboom, 1999, 79). 
Extensive 
Narrow 
Discrete Embedded
Resource base
      Interfirm 
      relationship 
Quasi integration/ 
technocratic 
Committee Consensus/Senate 
Primus or 
Dominated/supply 
I II
IV III
Formal lead partner 
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Informal leadership 
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Professional standards 
Personal relationships
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consensus
culture 
Majority voting
trust
Habits/routines
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The Dutch open marketplace and trading system in horticulture is unique in facilitating a 
system that combines steering mechanisms that are either value-oriented (e.g. motivation by self-
interest), stakeholder binding (e.g. 100% of deals via auction, or out), or relate to loyalty 
(values/norms, family). Flor-i-Log, expanding across Europe, cannot expect local firms to be 
attracted by loyalty-based steering-mechanisms, such as social control. The same goes for trading 
and transportation firms who have their stakes, history and running businesses. In line with 
preceding sections one may argue that all need incentives, to bridge the gap towards local-for-local 
trade outside Holland. In conformity to preceding sections, firms should ‘tie down’ relationships, 
which acknowledges the prevalence of an opportunistic approach, and the need to make binding 
contracts (see figure 9). Complementary, also the governance strategy to ‘attract’ firms may be 
advised in order to stress a value-for-money orientation. 
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE. HOW TO GET THERE? 
 
Although many authors on business networks has considered networks as given contexts, here 
cooperation and the related network structure is the object of deliberate design (Lorenzoni, & 
Lipparini, 1999, in: Moller & Svahn, 2006, p.986). Dependent on the type of a major industry 
events, one can expect different firms to mobilize resources, orchestrate the transition towards 
specific business networks. 
Network determination and value systems. 
On thedimension of level of external determination ,e find three ideal types of alternative 
networked value systems. The network has a high level of determination when the value-creating 
activities and related resources are well-known (Moller & Svahn, 2006), and the useful knowledge 
can be codified, and optimally exploited (See figure 5). Networks that show high levels of 
determination may be called running or current business networks. They are stable value systems, 
that best suit defender strategies (Miles & Snow, 1992). In day-to-day contacts, issues of 
coordination prevail over issues of cooperation. We may derive that the socalled ‘current business 
networks’ are similar to the supply dominated /supply network configuration, discussed earlier. The 
current business networks have multi-tiered actors and clearly defined activities and resources. 
Regarding coordination of activities, think of lean manufacturing and assembly on demand. 
Especially modular or decomposable end products may be expected here, with highly specialized 
partners, requiring codified knowledge and transparent formats. An example is Dell’s elaborate 
network. The orchestrator must willingly accept mutual dependencies. Furthermore, they should 
combine elements of strong cooperation with delegated self-organization to stimulate variety and 
specialization. In a current business network the network orchestrator typically has a strong 
purchasing position or sales position to bind self-interested firms to participate in his network and 
share knowledge. 
The contrary position to current business networks is emerging business network, entailing 
low levels of (external) determination; radical changes in value creation activities comes with 
uncertainty about the necessary activities and suitable network partners. One may call them 
emerging or new business networks, for whole new value systems and related networks are created. 
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For example, in the 1990s old actors from telecom and electronics had to transform rapidly and link 
up to newly emerging networks and value chains with its new firms in computers, mobiles, 
networks, software, new media, etc. Cooperation and corporate diplomacy prevailed over 
coordination issues. Nowadays new business networks emerge in, e.g., biofuels. No longer is the 
optimized exploitation of explicit knowledge critical, but the imagination and exploration of new 
business opportunities, which is typical for a prospector strategy (Miles & Snow, 1992). Problematic 
for (accelerating) progress of these networks is that ideas are often fuzzy, tacit and dispersed. 
Furthermore, specialization of actors makes it difficult to develop a systemic perspective 
encompassing the different evolving technologies  
 
FIGURE 5 
Value system continuum of value systems and corresponding network types  
Source: Moller & Svahn, 2006 
 
 
and value activities. As a result, the value to the knowledge is very uncertain, while the 
potential value activities are ambiguous. When it comes to the (former) orchestrator, he must be able 
to balance strong and weak ties in the network, i.e. established and unorthodox relationships. He 
may expose himself to and explore new views, and technologies, but to benefit from it he must have 
absorptive capacity ((Moller & Svahn, 2006), and be able to transform itself. Moreover, to be able to 
develop a new business network, the orchestrator must set the agenda, have attractive resources or 
knowledge, and create an meeting forum to deal with cooperation issues, and create an network 
identity. This happened when Nokia provided open access to part of its mobile’s source code in 
order to propagate the creation of and stimulate interoperability for 3G mobile services.  
In between the extreme types of current business network and emerging new business 
network, we find the third archetype business renewal network, which prioritizes effectiveness. 
When networks prioritize effectiveness, taking a balanced position between exploration and 
exploitation, between new and established value activities, than product modifications or efficiency 
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enhancing practices may lead to new opportunities (Moller & Svahn, 2006). Due to specialization 
one has to cooperate strongly as resources and capabilities necessary for renewal are dispersed 
among various partners. Business renewal networks suits also when a running network requires 
temporary upheaval to adjust systematically its activities to suit, e.g., a new ICT-platform. Here the 
critical capability is the bridging of structural holes, connecting different groups or different existing 
networks. To link different communities or networks one must develop or have the ability to cross 
professional, sectoral, or geographical sub-cultures. Renewal comes with collaborative learning, 
explicit goals and timetables. Problematic for collaborative learning are cultural distance, and 
organizational differences. The externalization of knowledge, i.e. from tacit to explicit, in a peer-to-
peer setting may help to overcome such barriers (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, in Moller & Svahn, 
2006, 995-6). The renewal network will benefit from previous partner relationships, alliance 
experience, relational governance structures, and the sharing of resulting benefits. The orchestrator 
should balance space, time and resources for exploration with exploitation, i.e. not losing turnover 
and efficiency. 
The impact of major events on network structures. 
The initiator and propagator of network changes is expected to be different with structure 
reinforcing events vs structure-loosening events (Madhavan et al., 1998, 439). A structure 
reinforcing event may further centralize a network, consolidating the various network positions. An 
orchestrator, i.e. the more autonomous focal firm, holding a central, bridging position before an 
industry event, is expected to propagate the adaption to a structure reinforcing event, in order to 
consolidate its position (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001, 435). The consolidation of the steel industry 
in the 1980s was such a case (Koka et al.. 2006, 727). 
With structure-loosening events it is more probably that orchestrators are reactive instead of 
taking the initiative, because they are tailored to fit not the new but the former market constellation 
(Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Structure-loosening events are to the advantage of some of the less 
central firms or new entrants. At least temporarily, the network will be less centralized to adapt to 
the developments. The new market leader becomes successful because it is focused on the new 
setting following the market event. However, it is difficult to predict in an early stage which firm 
becomes the new orchestrator. Structure-loosening events come with increases in uncertainty. Older 
firms including the orchestrator will have to scrap investments, reposition the firm, invest in new 
technologies, and develop new relationships, knowledge, and routines. Present orchestrators and 
other central firms will become less attractive partners, unless they have the motivation, ability and 
resources to pick and nurture the new winners (Madhavan et al., 1998, 455). In the subcase that also 
resources are increasing or abundant, existing firms may try to ally with a substantial set of new 
possibilities. New ties will be created, and many socalled ‘network options’ may be taken. The 
network will increase in size and range of ties (Koka et al. 2006, 730). Here, one may think of Cisco 
acting as venture capitalist to firms working on new technologies. In various industries, however, 
uncertainty comes with reduced resources. The lack of sufficient resources deepens dependency on 
critical resources, and for those unable to replace outdated ties by ties with winning partners will end 
up out of competition. An example, is the radical change in the Swiss watchmaking industry, due to 
the introduction of flexible production technologies and marketing practices, which brought about 
the new orchestrator Swatch (Jacobides & Winter, 2005). 
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Day-to-day-coordination or network orchestration may incrementally impact developmental 
paths of firms, but here we emphasize the disruption of coordinated activities, i.e. the realization of 
discontinuous changes, by the cooperative mobilization of resources following industry events. 
Think of industry events as widely recognized shocks, such as regulatory reform, radical 
technological innovation, or drastic changes in consumer preferences. Actors with a comparable 
history, activity, product and level of investment may, following an industry event, realize wholly 
different competitive advantages (Lundgren, 1992, in: Axelsson & Easton, 1992, p.157). Creating 
new or changing existing networks changes the interfirm relationships, and thus the positions of 
individual firms, the balance of powers in networks, and thus the performance of the firms involved. 
Mobilisation of actors and resources. 
When discussing major external industry events one must distinguish between Network 
integrative mobilisation and Network changing mobilisation. Mobilisation is ‘the process of forming 
crowds, groups and associations and organizations for the pursuit of collective goals.’ (Lundgren, 
1992, in: Axelsson & Easton, 1992, p.159) Network integrative mobilisation relates to expanding 
the network of existing activities, similar to business renewal networks. For example, one may go 
international by opening an foreign sales office of a joint facility abroad. It is a market investment, 
when such mobilization of extra resource is done by partners from a current business network. 
When the group is convinced on the need to act there will be little problem to mobilize the required 
resources. The partners will focus on the allocation of the extra capacity, less on the investment 
costs itself. Network integrative mobilisation suits change processes were most of the skills, routines 
and practices currently in use have to be preserved. 
Network changing mobilisation relates to combining previously unrelated (different or similar) 
activities (Lundgren, 1992, in: Axelsson & Easton, 1992, p.159-161), that may result in the 
emergence of new business networks. When the degree of perceived change is rather low, the 
leading firms will have to face resistance from within the existing network, and outsiders may be 
first to mobilize resources, introduce new technologies, and openly compete for existing market 
positions. Compared to the preceding case they should anticipate to mobilize a larger share of the 
required resources internally. An initiator may need to re-orient towards less centrally positioned 
partners, to mobilize sufficient backing and resources, and realize changes. To conclude, unless 
timely redirection of resources is realized by the current orchestrator, it is probable that with major 
structure-loosening events new business networks emerge, with a new orchestrator, successful in 
network changing mobilization. 
Regarding the Potted Plant network, we observe that the enlargement of the EU and various 
market developments (in production, changing market shares, shifts between country-customer 
segments) are structure loosening events. Such events increase uncertainty, and weaken power 
positions, what is to the advantage of ambitious decentralized firms and new entrants. In Europe 
relative outsiders, e.g. from Italy, have taken the initiative to explore new chain-related 
opportunities. They go for network changing mobilisation of resources and actors, combining 
previously unrelated activities. In the Netherlands, however, we see mergers between equals 
(auctions, traders, transporters) which is typically suited for the contrary case of structure 
reinforcing events, such as consolidation in the retail-segment. Such events may be in the interest of 
key players, in the center of networks. Flor-i-Log wants to roll out the Dutch open-marketplace 
model, but it does not seem to be looking for a new value system, i.e. a radical change of system. 
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Flor-I-Log partners seem to prefer to expand some of the known services to new countries: The 
value chains are known, and one is looking for adjustments, expanding the existing system. This 
network integrative mobilization expands the Dutch marketplace network to encompass foreign 
firms. To realize this as a group will probably demand maximum efforts of the current consensus-
type of network without a orchestrator. Only with a strong eagerness to change at group-level will 
this result in the preferred renewal of the business network. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We started this paper by detailing the two perspectives of interfirm relationships and access to 
resources. By combining two dimensions, coming from two radically different perspectives, we 
made clear that organizing for competitive advantage benefits from relating the level of firm 
embeddeness to access to resources and to what ends. Indeed, the structuration suggests that 
competitive advantage is both a matter of relationships and access to resources. The resulting 
variation in types of networks can account for the different responses to competition. The elements 
are interfirm relationships, resource bases, network governance instruments, coordination 
mechanisms, network determination, and resource mobilisation. Thereby, the paper is able to detail 
5 generic types of business networks. The paper identifies the basis elements and it facilitates both 
comparison among empirical examples of companies’ competitiveness, and the network design by 
firms. The paper may become of added value to both network literature and business practices by 
detailing, both conceptually and by illustrations, the structuring of business networks. 
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